Civil War?

Tensions within the Lebanese society are at a level comparable only to those before the civil war of 1975. Following Hezbollah’s latest military adventure, the country is more polarised than ever. Witness the incidents between the refugees and the residents in the Chouf, in Beirut, in the Beka’a and in Jounieh. In the Chouf, predominantly pro-Hezbollah Shiite refugees refused to receive aid from the Druze, who constitute the majority of residents of the area the refugees had fled to, claiming that Walid Jumblatt, the leader of the Druze and a vocal critic of Hezbollah, was an Israeli agent. In the Beka'a, Hezbollah representatives in charge of handling aid to the refugees refused to receive bread donated by Sa'ad Hariri, son and political heir of the assassinated Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, since the donor was Sunni and, in the view of some members of Hezbollah, a traitor and an agent. In Jouniyeh, some Hezbollah supporters went out of their way to provoke the predominantly Christian residents of the area, prompting residents to repay them in kind. Perhaps the most extreme case was a few weeks before that, with the airing of an episode of Basmat Watan, a political satire show, that poked fun at Mr Hassan Nasrallah, the Secretary General of Hezbollah. His supporters responded by attacking Christian and Sunni areas in Beirut. Each of these incidents led to scuffles and fights, but luckily, no guns were involved in any of them. Though with Syria arming its allies, this can and is being changed.

The situation in Lebanon today strongly resembles that before the war in 1975. There is an immense amount of sectarian tension. Lebanese public opinion is split into two radical extremes. One perceives Hezbollah as the guardian of Lebanon, charged with fighting Israel, and perceives all who oppose it as traitors and agents of Zionism. The other sees in Hezbollah a threat to the very existence of an independent, pluralistic Lebanon, and sees that group as a tool for Iran and Syria. A similar schism characterised the perception of the Palestinians’ guns in 1970s Lebanon.

In the 1960s, the armed presence of the Palestinians, the threat that that presence presented towards Lebanon’s independence and the severely divergent perceptions of where the country should go prompted other, mostly Christian, factions to arm themselves and prepare for what was then termed ‘self security’. Today, anti-Syrian forces speak of the need for ‘self-security’ yet again. People are buying guns, ‘just in case’. There is talk of the need of ‘neighbourhood watches’ –armed, of course- to ward off the next onslaught that follows a comedy show.

Hezbollah’s guns, and its conduct, strongly resemble the state-within-a-state that the Palestinians built during the 1960s and 1970s. Hezbollah, for more than a decade now, handles security in the areas it controls, namely the South, parts of the Beka’a, and the Southern Suburb of Beirut (Dahyeh). It has schools, welfare programmes, a planning and construction company, a micro-credits institution and several orphanages. It has established zones where Lebanese police and army dare not enter, though this has changed after the last war. Unfortunately, whether or not this change is to be a lasting one depends very much on Syria, Iran and Hezbollah, and not on the Lebanese people or their elected representatives in government.

In the 1970s, there were regional and international backers keen to support the various factions and instigate and propagate the war, because Lebanon had been made the confrontation scene between the US and the Soviet Union, and between Syria and Israel, as well as other regional forces, with the various militias being made into proxies. Fatah-land, or the state within the state carved out by the Palestinians, became the igniting issue. Today, Iran and the US, and Syria and Israel, constitute a very similar pool of potential backers and financiers. The various Lebanese factions have scarcely changed. Hizbullah-land constitutes a similar ignition fuse.

Civil wars need high internal tensions, a compelling, seemingly intractable dividing issue, and foreign backers to supply moneys and arms. Lebanon has all of these and worse. It has Syria, that perceives a conflict in Lebanon to be in its best interest, since all seriously armed factions –Amal, the Ahbash, the Ba’ath, Hezbollah, and the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party- are pro-Syria. Of those, the smaller groups (i.e., all of them except Amal and Hezbollah), have an interest in returning to a civil war, since that would restore the power they enjoyed under the Syrian tutelage. Indeed, a civil war would recreate the atmosphere that led to their prominence in the first place. And Syria, according to news reports since April 2005, the date of its withdrawal, is distributing guns to these factions. Instability in Lebanon paved the way for Syrian tutelage, and can do so again. With increased provocations, as the ones we saw around refugee centres and after that television episode, light, limited clashes here and there become inescapable. Similar to ones we saw in the early seventies. And as the number of clashes increases, ever more people feel the need to arm themselves and guard against ‘the other’. The state, whose main function is to ensure the safety of its people, loses the capacity to fulfil this role. Its power is eroded. Armed factions crop up to fill the gap. Civil strife becomes all out war. Was this not what happened in 1975?

The key question is can Hezbollah benefit from a low level civil conflict in Lebanon? A war in Lebanon now would neutralize Amal, Hezbollah's Shiite rival-cum-partner. Amal, out of which Hezbollah sprang following the 1982 Israeli invasion, has become the more moderate Shiite faction in Lebanon, though it still has an armed force. A war would bring the fighting faction of Amal closer to Hezbollah, and erode the former's role, making Hezbollah the exclusive representative of Lebanese Shiites. Hezbollah has been heavily investing for a very long time in its state-within-the-state. There, it has unlimited power and access. It ‘collects donations’ (taxes) and controls security. It is not likely to wish to give up its autonomy. Civil conflict would weaken the state and give Hizbullah even freer reign in Lebanon. It would establish Lebanon as the major front line for the war on Israel, something that has always been at the core of Hizbullah’s ideology. Hezbollah has the resources to survive in isolation in the areas it controls, especially that with the weakening of the state and the porous nature of the Lebanese-Syrian border, it can continue to receive supplies from its Iranian patrons. But can it defend its territories against the Lebanese, while continuing its guerrilla war on Israel?

On the other hand, Hezbollah has given reconciliatory signals in the last few days. First, there was the acceptance of its ministers in government of the plans to send the Lebanese Army south of the Litani river. A few days later, Hezbollah allowed the confiscation of a cache of missiles that the Lebanese Army found. Then there was Hassan Nasrallah’s confirmation that there will be no visible armed presence for Hezbollah in areas where the Lebanese Army deploys. Last there was Nasrallah’s regret over the costs of the war to Lebanon, saying that had he known the magnitude of the Israeli onslaught he would have not ordered the capture of the two soldiers.

My opinion is this. Hezbollah are experts at brinkmanship. They would not want to start a civil war because Israel would intervene very heavily, fully supporting any militias fighting the Party of God. While surviving the attacks of the Israeli army for a month is one thing, a prolonged war against Lebanese militias from the North and the Israeli army from the South is another. Any serious attempts by Syria or Iran to defend Hezbollah could lead to a full scale regional war. Both regimes do not want that, as Iran’s strategic goal is to gain nuclear weapons to deter exactly that. And a war against Syria would seriously weaken an already vulnerable and unpopular regime.

Hezbollah benefits most from the sword of civil war being held over Lebanon’s neck. Hezbollah will allow its allies, Syria’s lackeys, to create incidents and threaten the civil peace, while appearing to be the one holding them back (just as it did after the Basmat Watan episode). Thus the Lebanese army will not be able to actually disarm Hezbollah fearing the possibility of war, and the March 14 group will be forced to return to the National Dialogue, where Hezbollah can manoeuvre and buy time again and again. Hezbollah will hold on to its guns for as long as it can, while trying not to provoke the Lebanese army. But this brinkmanship may cost Lebanon dearly. Eventually, the first bullet in 1975 was fired by the Christians.