Please...

بعيد منتصف ليل أمس، تمّ التوصل في الدوحة الى اتفاق لبناني ـ لبناني

Please let it be true !
Please let it be the beginning !
Please let it be that in a few years, the Lebanese youth can return home, live in Lebanon, grow with Lebanon...
Don't ruin it! this is the Starting Point...
The line above is a first since 1943... we never made a Lebanese-Lebanese existential decision before... yes existential: A few more hours and we would have had to watch our country get lost again for God knows how long..
Everybody please unite now, and build Lebanon

NEW BLOG

Hello everyone,

I would like to apologize to any readers we still have left for not putting more content up on this site... Since Lebanon remains eventful, as always, there is no excuse save for a lack of effort or time. In any case, until we all get the ball rolling on this site again, I would like to invite anyone interested to read www.pagelebanon.blogspot.com, which I have revived as a forum for Lebanese affairs (it was previously a history page).

Many thanks,

- The Silent (Anthony Elghossain)

A stolen dream...

I hope readers will like this post disregarding their political views...
It's written in simple words, yet very deep. (and sad)

Freedom-fighters, did your tale come to an end?
by Maya Kanaan.


Here I am, holding some papers, looking at them, putting them down, then looking at them again.

Meanwhile, I am zapping through TV stations, watching the big buzz my country’s presidential elections has created, not only internally, but in other countries as well, and wondering. I see people going to and coming from Bkerki, meeting the Patriarch, meeting Berri, meeting Hariri, meeting Aoun, meeting each other, and then going back to meeting the Patriarch, meeting Berri…. And I thought, how ridiculous they are; playing with our fate, deciding of what to happen to us tomorrow, the day after, in 6 years, in 20 years, while we, the people are watching. We are watching our life, our future pass by in front of us, inert, helpless, intoxicated.

So what’s the deal about this president of Lebanon after all? Bush does not let a day pass by without him mentioning Lebanon, Sarkozy sends his emissaries to meet up with Syria (Syria the arch nemesis) to discuss Lebanon, Ahmadi Najad flies from country to another to discuss Lebanon, Russia is talking about Lebanon, Switzerland is talking about Lebanon, Egypt, KSA, Jordan, Botswana (?) are talking about Lebanon.
Wow, I envy this Lebanon, I guess it has some hidden charm that we are failing to see. I mean, who would have thought that such a small country, the size of one of the smallest states in the US, with barely 4 million inhabitants, with no resources, NO OIL, basically nothing (we won’t mention the human factor here because it is becoming irrelevant), would rise up all this fuss. I would have liked to see it happening at the elections of Connecticut’s mayor, Connecticut being slightly bigger than Lebanon.

So back to the question, what is it in Lebanon that we are failing to see? What do all these powers have up their sleeves prepared for the Lebanese people? One would think that well, the bigger, stronger brother would help his little brother to survive, to get strong, but then again, am I dreaming? All we see around us are small, weak, vulnerable countries, stepped on, slashed, torn into shreds, deprived of their basic dignity, and whenever this is the case, one of the Big Brothers has, one way or another, something to do with it.

I zap, and I remember myself, 17 years ago, tears in my eyes, looking at what I thought to be my last hope in a country where I will live free and proud, taken from me. I close my eyes and remember the deafening sound of those fighter planes bombing what was called the “Free Area” in Lebanon. Those Syrian planes, with a worldwide blessing, that took away my dream. I thought it was over, my free, proud Lebanon. But then, a movement saw the light, a movement that made me hope again. A movement of young boys and girls who stood against despotism, facing beatings, jailing, humiliation, looking for a better tomorrow, a tomorrow in which they will be “free, sovereign, independent”. It took them 15 years, and at the end of the tunnel, came the light. In 2005, these boys and girls who became men and women, fathers and mothers, welcomed the lost hope. For the first time in their lives, they saw their country free of any foreign occupancy, a country for them, from them. Alas, their dream did not last too long. Once again, the Big Brothers came to the “free” country, intervened, advised, imposed, and ripped the newly independent people of their freedom.
Today, after 2 years of the Syrian occupation ending in Lebanon, the Lebanese are facing yet another type of despotism, this time a diplomatic one. The people are not allowed to choose their president (as per the Lebanese constitution), however, in our political system, unfortunately governed by sectarianism, the President is to be Christian (Maronite). So how come many Lebanese, and specifically Christians, have never felt so oppressed, even during the Syrian hegemony? How come it feels that the whole world is conniving against the Free People? How come we have polls, surveys, by the day, regarding the presidency’s issue, and at the end, the Big Brothers choose for us who is at the very end of the poll, or as it happens, who is not on the poll to start with?

So, will this next president of Lebanon be the savior of mankind? Will he have in his hand the key to the worldwide dilemma, will he be as important as all the Big Brothers combined? He must be, otherwise, all what is happening in Lebanon would be rather theatrical, ironic, futile.

That, or maybe the next president has to give in to the Big Brothers, be one of them, a buddy, but then again, the Big Brothers do not really believe in friendship; especially when you are small. You can be a lackey, a servant, if you are lucky enough, an agent, nothing more.

Here I am, looking at my papers again, thinking how sad, after all the struggles, the resistance, the dreams, the hopes, I, the freedom-fighter, the person who never let go, not under the worst pressures, not under the strongest oppressions, today, when my country is “free” for the first time in my lifetime, am holding immigration form, to be filled before the end of the week.
Will my forms be filled? Will they end up in the trash bin? I won’t have to wait too long, just 72 hours, and I will know. Most importantly, I will know where, in many years (hopefully), I, the Lebanese freedom-fighter, will be buried, whether in the land of my ancestors or in a foreign land.

The Lebanese Dance

The Middle East has, more so than any other region, experienced political developments of great significance to the region in particular and the international system more generally. These weeks may be remembered as such, with the issuing of the Petraeus report, a new message from Osama Bin-Laden due soon, and a Lebanese presidential election immediately forthcoming. The purpose of this discussion is to outline the relevance of the Lebanese elections at the domestic (this particular election carries added importance) and regional levels.

Many would argue that the latter issue—dealing with the Lebanese presidency—will drag on until November (or perhaps longer). Some may also doubt the broader strategic relevance of a presidential election in Lebanon, especially considering the marginal political and economic impact of the country itself. The fact that these elections often elucidate the penetration of the Lebanese state, its impressionable elite-based system, and the fragmented and externally-influenced nature of the population, only adds credence to the view that these elections are of little significance to the broader region. Yet Lebanon political developments serve as an effective gauge of the regional situation, precisely because of the interplay that is evident in the relationship between local elites and international patrons. Thus, alongside Hamas-Fatah dealings, the interaction of Lebanese factions is quite indicative of broader developments in the Middle East—that is, between the United States, Israel, and their Arab allies on the one hand, and Iran, Syria, Hamas, and Hezbollah on the other.

In Lebanon, the first camp—supported by the United States and, less overtly, by Israel—is known as the March 14th coalition and consists of the Sunni Future Movement (Hariri), the Druze Progressive Socialist Party (Jumblatt), and the Christian Lebanese Forces (Geagea). The latter camp—backed by Iran and Syria—is known as the March 8th coalition and consists of the Shi'ite parties AMAL (Berri) and Hezbollah (Nasrallah), as well as the Christian Free Patriotic Movement (Aoun). While this is of course a generalization, it is fair to say that the current divisions in Lebanon pit a Christian-Druze-Sunni pro-government coalition against a Christian-Shi'ite opposition movement. It is evident, yet again, that elites on both sides of the divide have become involved in a struggle that transcends their significance as political agents.

The March 14th movement controls the premiership, and enjoys a majority in both the cabinet and parliament. However, the largely successful performance of the Aoun and his allies (the Murr faction in the Metn region, and the Skaff bloc in Zahle) during the 2005 parliamentary elections has proven to be a great obstacle to any designs put forth by the governing coalition. Capturing around 70% of the Christian vote, the Aounist bloc (the term will be used here to include his allies) managed to garner 22 seats in the parliament, denying March 14th the two-thirds majority in parliament that is necessary to push through any drastic political objective in the Lebanese system. Because cabinets in Lebanon tend to serve as microcosms—confessionally and otherwise—of the parliament, rather than executive instruments of the elected majority, the opposition has since been able to undermine the government by stressing the importance of representation (Aoun desires more portfolios, as he currently holds none) and confessional coexistence (the Shi'ite withdrawal from cabinet has, the opposition claims, stripped it of sectarian balance). Furthermore, Nabih Berri, the Speaker of Parliament, heads the AMAL movement, a prominent party within the opposition camp and a traditionally secularist (but largely Shi'ite) pro-Syrian party. Parliament has not convened this year, as Berri has argued that the opposition is correct in demanding a reconfigured and expanded government. The myriad of proposed solutions, objections, and varying legal interpretations regarding the current stand-off have been discussed elsewhere, and will not be delved into here. Let us instead focus on the issue of the presidency, for these elections hold the next six years of Lebanese politics in the balance, and may perhaps allow one to glimpse signs of provocation, retreat, or rapprochement in the Mid-East.

The main candidates (listed alphabetically, so as to avoid offense) are as follows: Michel Aoun (March 8th), Boutros Harb (March 14th), Nassib Lahoud (March 14th), and General Michel Suleiman (Commander of the Armed Forces; finds more support in the March 8th camp). There are many more candidates, but it seems that these are the main players as it stands today. Now, General Aoun has repeatedly stated that he is the sole compromise candidate and the only individual with the requisite combination of personal popularity and parliamentary support (both vital in a system where the president has minimal formal authorities). Thus, we will assume—unless there is a defection from within his ranks—that Aoun is the only viable candidate within the opposition movement. As for the governing coalition, it has reiterated its intent to formally present a single candidate before the elections are to be held—this candidate may be Boutros Harb or Nassib Lahoud, as mentioned before, but the secrecy involved could signal the rise of, among others, Doumianos Kattar (a competent individual who has not alienated members of the opposition) or another run by former president Amine Gemayel (buoyed by an increase in the popularity of the Phalange).

While it is natural for most observers to focus on the potentially dangerous precedent of a vacant presidency, it is worth noting the deeper issues at stake. Simply put, the opposition currently holds 57 seats in parliament, thus denying March 14th the two-thirds needed to guarantee an electoral quorum. There are those who argue that the constitution only states that a two-thirds quorum is needed for the first vote, and that any subsequent vote requires a simple majority. This is false, as the constitution explicitly states that the quorum for a presidential election, under normal circumstances, is two-thirds of the total membership of parliament. The opposition, then, may block the September 25th election without contravening the constitution. However, the Article 73 of the constitution states that the Chamber, if not summoned for the purpose of election, "meets of its own accord on the tenth day preceding the expiration of the President's term of office." It would seem that March 14th could simply wait until November and elect a president with the absolute majority that is attainable with their 71 seats. Yet again, a qualification is in order: Article 74 states that the chamber is "considered an electoral body," and the opposition has interpreted this to mean that the two-thirds quorum is still necessary. Again, one is faced with an infinite regression concerned with quorums and majority-quotas—there is a danger that the real issue at hand will be lost in the bickering.

Considering the proper interpretation of an article of the constitution entails an inquiry as to the purpose of the constitution itself—in script and spirit. The script (Article 73) explicitly states that parliament convenes ten days before the end-of-term, rather than stating that parliament is called into session by the Speaker, as it does elsewhere. It would seem, then, that a quorum is not requisite for the election of a president if that point is reached. Indeed, the purpose of a constitution—the spirit of the law, or meta-constitution—is to enshrine and protect the values of the society that abides by it. Those opposed to the election of any president from a divergent political movement, in effect oppose the election itself, rather than a particular candidate. The opposition, holding a minority stake by definition, cannot legitimately seek to block elections should a compromise fall through. If this were accepted as a political practice, then any majority short of two-thirds would be rendered superfluous and it would be possible, in practice, for any opposition bloc, regardless of future configurations, to prevent the election of a president. In such a scenario, any grouping of 44 MPs—acting independently, at the behest of a few zu'ama, or due to foreign coercion—holds the potential to paralyze the mechanisms of government. This should not be, cannot be, the logic that underlies the Lebanese constitutional framework, for all its other faults. In any case, the Lebanese, leaders and followers, are neither willing nor able to break from the entangled regional milieu. The aversion or acceleration of crisis will reflect the trajectory of the stand-off between the American-Israeli-Saudi and Iranian-Syrian alignments.

General Petraeus has recommended a phased withdrawal resulting in pre-surge troop levels by July, and this is likely to be the course of action chosen by the Bush administration. The phased withdrawal plan and talks of a new base near the Iraq-Iran border indicate that the United States is seeking to significantly reduce its direct involvement in Iraq whilst restraining a potential Iranian ascent in the Persian Gulf. American presence in the Mid-East will be lessened, perhaps restructured, but will not, in any case, be eliminated altogether. The most probable scenario would be the bolstering of the American military presence in Kuwait, the Persian Gulf, and perhaps the establishment of U.S. bases in the outer provinces of Iraq.

Conversely, it is difficult to read Iranian intent in the region—this is why the Saudis and Israelis are uneasy. That is, no one has been able to precisely determine the purpose behind Iran's projection of power. Security is a goal, indeed, and regional domination may potentially be so, but it is hard to make the case that antagonizing the Americans, Saudis, and Israelis can be done in the interest of security, and the attempt at regional domination makes little sense in material terms (Iran is already oil-rich, and the amount of oil funds being thrown at Hezbollah and Hamas has resulted in price pressures within the country). The purpose may be ideological, and the projection itself is a result of American entanglement, fears of U.S. action against the Islamic regime, and the buffer provided by the removal of Saddam and the empowerment of the Shi'ites in Iraq. The question is whether or not the regime perceives benefit in further pushing the United States, still potent yet critically stretched, or waiting for even more favorable conditions (American elections, a new administration).

Whatever the case may be it seems that regional factors and the politics on the ground will push Lebanon past September 25th and to the brink in November—the coming months will indicate if the fragile state will again descend into the abyss or, as in years past, formulate an arrangement that postpones strife without resolving the underlying issues at play. Many believe that a president will not be elected. While it is tempting to argue otherwise, analysis indicates that it is simply irrelevant. The election of a president may be imposed by the West and March 14th, but acceptance of his mandate may not. If a president is not elected, then the opposition would surely object to the transfer of power to the cabinet and, meanwhile, the governing coalition has already stated its objection to an emergency government under General Michel Suleiman. Furthermore, Parliament remains closed, and the Constitutional Council (Supreme Court) has yet to be established. Indeed, the formal mechanisms of government usually mean little in Lebanon, but such a vacuum is unprecedented—the Lebanese system, by December, may be functioning without a president, without a fully recognized government, without an active parliament, in the absence of a Court to determine the constitutionality of each party's actions.

Perhaps, the United States, France, Saudi Arabia, and Israel will, alongside March 14th, elect to simply push through elections. Perhaps Iran and Syria, alongside Hezbollah, will decide to acquiesce in the short-term. The converse may happen, as the former camp may attempt to appease their opponents in hopes of a regional détente. One can only wait and observe as the United States and Iran either converge or drift further apart. Lebanon and the Palestinian Authority remain the most effective barometers of regional pressures and strategic intent but, come December, they may both, in one way or another, have far more in common.

MEI Perspective (in simple words...)

Reappraise US Lebanon policy
August 16, 2007.
By Graeme Bannerman


The defeat of former Lebanese President Amin Gemayel in a local by-election in Metn earlier this month is like the death of a canary in the coalmine.
American policymakers should be warned that it is time to reshape our Lebanon policy. Otherwise, a larger tragedy awaits.

The Metn region, an eastern Beirut suburb, is overwhelmingly Christian and probably more pro-American than any place in the Middle East. The people who live there are educated, prosperous and cosmopolitan. They share the American goals of keeping Syria out of Lebanon, opposing international terrorism and strengthening Lebanese democracy. They still have great respect for the Gemayel family, which includes a former president elect and a cabinet minister, both of whom were assassinated. Nevertheless, the voters rejected the Gemayel patriarch and put their faith in an unknown and uncharismatic candidate opposed to the policies of the current government.
No place in Lebanon is more hostile to Syrian influence than the Metn. On March 14, 2005, the people of Metn were united in demonstrating against Syria’s military and intelligence services continuing their control of Lebanon. They all cheered when the Syrians withdrew and were grateful to President Bush for demanding the Syrians withdraw. The people of Metn agree any increase in Syrian influence should be prevented and Syrian interference in Lebanese affairs eliminated.
A growing number, however, think the confrontational approach to Syria of the Siniora Government and espoused by the US will not succeed.

More and more Lebanese believe that if Lebanon is seen by Syria as a threat to Syrian national security or as an instrument which the US uses to threaten or intimidate Syria, Damascus is likely to increase its coercion and foster instability in Lebanon. The way to minimize Syrian interference in Lebanese internal affairs is for Lebanon not to be seen as a threat to Damascus.

Syria is clearly much weaker than the US, but it has greater interests in Lebanon. The US may view Lebanon as a concern but not as essential to its national security. Lebanese, like the voters in Metn, increasingly think US interests in Lebanon are unsustainable and will fade, but Syrian interest will not. In the 1980s, even though the US had troops in Lebanon, then-Syrian president Hafiz al-Assad noted, “the Americans are short of breath.” He was proven correct. When the US wanted Syrian support in the 1990 Gulf crisis, Washington acquiesced in Damascus asserting full control over Lebanon. Those Lebanese who had opted for a policy of confrontation with Syria — many of them from Metn — suffered greatly.
Metn voters also view international terrorism as a scourge on all of our lives. They support the Lebanese Army’s battle against Fatah al-Islam and favor confronting international terrorism. However, most do not share the American view that Hizbullah should be lumped together with international terrorists.
Views of Hizbullah vary widely throughout Metn. Most are uncomfortable with the strength and influence of Hizbullah and believe armed militias are not in the national interest. But they argue that if the Israeli army cannot disarm Hizbullah, how can anyone expect the Lebanese army to do so? The majority recognizes Hizbullah as part of the fabric of Lebanese society and the dominant influence in the largest Lebanese community. No peace and reconciliation can come to Lebanon if Hizbullah is not part of the equation. Even the majority in the Metn now believes it is time to test reconciliation to prevent more pain and suffering.The call by President Bush for more democracy in the Middle East was widely applauded in Lebanon. Most Lebanese believed their state, despite its flaws, was the most open and democratic in the region. One of the harshest complaints against the Syrians was the wanton destruction of Lebanon’s democratic institutions. But, US support for some constitutionally questionable actions by Fuad Siniora’s government has tarnished the democratic credentials of both and raised concerns over whether the US is committed to democracy or only uses democracy to promote American interests. In a country where the powers of government have been carefully divided among religious sects, US willingness to ignore the constitutional rights of the presidency worries many in Metn.

The US will find it difficult to convince many Lebanese that its commitment to democracy is universal and not situational.
American leaders need to realize that the local election in Metn is a clear signal of a shift in Lebanese opinion against American policy. Lebanese leaders who have linked their fate to American power and influence against their domestic opponents will use every means they have to persuade Washington not to change course.
The US administration must not be drawn into internal Lebanese political struggles. It needs to stand back and reassess US interests, goals and policies with a clear mind toward avoiding yet another Middle Eastern quagmire.


Author: Graeme Bannerman is an adjunct scholar at the Middle East Institute. He runs his own international consulting firm and is a former Staff Director for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

A Military Interim Government in the works for Lebanon?

The Taif Accord as far as power-sharing agreements go was effective in bringing an end to the Lebanese Civil War. Most policy schools of thought will tell you that one key element of any successful power-sharing platform is the presence of a foreign guarantor who enforces the agreement and ensures mutual compliance among domestic parties. The catch being, of course that any such external institution or state is neutral to the political elites on all sides of the conflict. We know that the Americans banked on the fact that Syria would act as this 'foreign guarantor' in Lebanon until a sustainable stability could be achieved. We also know that the Syrians were anything but a neutral external enforcer, ensuring that the internal situation would deteriorate when it withdrew leaving behind a tattered short-term power sharing agreement in Taif, which in of itself never truly addressed the core issues in Lebanon. It is common to view Taif as more than it actually was: a comprehensive platform for building a stable and secure state through effective power sharing between Lebanon's disparate minorities. In fact, Taif was simply a springboard and a starting point for achieving the former. Ideally in the 17 years since its signing, other frameworks should have been hashed out (we can thank Syria and various other internal elements for making sure that didn't happen). Instead, Taif has been allowed to out-live its best before date and we are in stalemate, slowly but surely returning to a state of war in Lebanon.

The events of the last eight months since the chaos of January 23rd have led us to the prospect of a transitional government headed by General Michel Suleiman, who has now gone on public record as being ready to take over if and when asked. It seems, at this stage with both the government and the opposition unable to come to any agreement on who should be President of the Republic, that an interim government is highly likely. What is troubling about this though is that the structure being proposed is that in order to bypass some constitutional hurdles regarding military personal taking over the presidential post, Suleiman could in fact be handed the Prime Ministership and allowed to form his own interim cabinet until an agreement between sides can be reached.

The question is can Lebanon afford another interim government and a military one at that? Interim governments usually imply an agreed upon process which will lead the country, at some point, to some level of stability. Stability, and even more importantly security, relies on some sort of legitimate monopoly over violence and force. Assuming this is true, is there any conceivable situation (at this stage) that would allow a transitional government to hand back power to a 'stable Lebanon'? With militias armed to the teeth, Hizballah being armed and supported materially and existentially by Syria/Iran who are hostile to the current government and the West who support it, the national army is being armed and supported materially and existentially by the West (who are hostile to the opposition) in a domestic battle against foreign elements in the North, Palestinian groups in Lebanon are reconstituting themselves, and so on and so forth. How can there be some sort of consolidation of power so that we arrive at a monopoly over the means of violence thereby ensuring stability? Who do we grant this too if we could? In fact, in a country like Lebanon is that monopoly something even possible or desirable? It is in fact one of the core issues, and one that Taif ineffectively does not address. So the answer to the last question might be 'probably not.'

In which case, what do we stand to benefit from an interim government if stability and security as we've loosely defined it almost impossible to come by in any short-term compromise or understanding? It could mean an extended rule for Suleiman and his crew because a long-term solution is not visible on the horizon (assuming a long-term solution is desirable lest we find ourselves in this same situation X months or years down the line). Some people may feel that we have nothing to worry about as Suleiman temporarily coming into power is legitimized as an agreement between the nation's political elites. People might be comforted by this fact but history has shown that military men know no bounds when in the seat of power. How easily will Suleiman hand power back? Can we be sure of this? And to whom? Despite Lebanon's political bodies coming to a light compromise on Suleiman, the process seems to alienate the legitimacy over power that can only be provided by the popular will of democratic elections, of course. Already, the democratically elected government we have in place is facing a legitimacy dilemma in the eyes of half of the country. What legitimacy can Suleiman hope to maintain (perhaps a fair amount in the short-term but at some stage a military rule might outstay its welcome)? To be sure Suleiman can capitalize on the current popularity of the army and if handled correctly he might come out a hero to some or many. However the law of diminishing returns with regards to a non-civilian order might catch up with him and quickly as the protracted stalemate extends weeks into months into years.

Potentially having this interim government in place would be ideal if with it came the assumption that a framework for a domestic political agreement is in the works in the form of national dialogue and mutual recognition (similar to the situation which precluded the need for Mikati's transitional rule two years ago) that will end the interim status of Suleiman's government. What is essential then (looping back to the Taif discussion) to ensure an interim military government fulfill its role and achieve progress at all, is a revitalization of Taif. In fact the interim government should serve as the catalyst for bringing all sides together at the table. Not simply as a passive placeholder. Its mandate should be active and progressive enough to ensure a comprehensive political agreement (which might include a new electoral law) is reached so that it can dissolve its rule and call parliamentary elections after which parliament can vote on a new President or put into a power a candidate agreeable to all sides. A recognition that Taif is not religious canon and is something that needs to be evolved refined and essentially re-written to be relevant in a post-Syria and post-Hariri Lebanon. But as far as we can tell, nothing is in the works. In fact, the situation is getting progressively worse and more aggressive (physically and verbally) with no one ready to sit across from one another to negotiate or discuss their way into some form of compromise in the national interest. The leader of the opposition, Hassan Nasrallah, is pre-occupied with preparing for another war with Israel. The government is pre-occupied with simply surviving and maintaining its legitimacy while at the same time ensuring civil order and fighting a war in the North. This is a dangerous position to be in prior to handing power over to the military, one that seems to preclude another turn to chaos. Eleanor Roosevelt might as well have been talking about Lebanon when she said, "We have to face the fact that either all of us are going to die together or we are going to learn to live together and if we are to live together we have to talk."

Aoun's Victory and March 14's Clumsy Reaction

In any democratic election, an extremely close outcome invariably leads to allegations of fraud and electoral misconduct. A closer examination of Michel Aoun's victory, however, shows that pro-government forces need not resort to such accusations to undermine Aoun in the aftermath of the Metn elections. For the devil, as they say, is in the details. And the details give Aoun little cause for comfort - provided March 14 knows how to use them against him.

As we are sure to hear time and again in the weeks to come, the Metn is a central part of Lebanon's Maronite heartland. Correspondingly, the Lebanese presidency - to which these elections speak - is a Maronite post. Aoun's followers have traditionally been Maronite Christians. Granted, the Presidential election coming up next month is not and should not be a Christian popularity contest - the president is head of state after all, elected by a multi-sectarian parliament. However, Aoun's claim to the presidency have been based on his (alleged) belief - as shown by the results of the 2005 parliamentary elections - that he enjoys the support of 75% of Lebanon's Christians. In yesterday's elections, however, Aoun managed to garner only one-third of the Maronite vote - a clear sign that Lebanon's Maronite Christian's are unimpressed with his alliance with Hizbullah and other pro-Syrian parties in Lebanon as well as his role in stalling Lebanon's economy and its political process. Of course, Aoun also received the support of the majority of the Metn's Christian Armenians (along with that of Michel Murr's pro-Syrian base) and this is what won Aoun the election by 400 votes. But the Armenians in Lebanon are seen as a separate sect in themselves - and are assigned political posts accordingly under Lebanon's confessional system. Aoun's maneouvering and alliances were cunning and ultimately won him the election. However, his presidential aspirations - and the case he has built in support of them - have been severely undermined. Any claim by Aoun to being the 'choice of the Christians' can now be safely ignored.

Another key grievance of Aoun's against the political order is his objection that the current electoral law allows too many Christians to be elected by non-Christians. Let us leave aside for the moment the blatantly sectarian and divisive nature of such thinking and take Aoun's comments at face value. A Maronite Christian winning an election in spite of his increasing unpopularity among Maronites and due to alliances with and the votes of other sects is in no position to complain about such a thing.

In addition to the voter breakdown and his declining popularity among Lebanese Maronites, Aoun's participation in the election and his fierce defense of its outcome only expose the hypocrisy of accusing the government of marginalizing the Maronite Christian presidency. These elections, in order to be held constitutionally, require the signature of the president of the republic, which Emile Lahoud has refused to grant. March 14's answer was to go ahead with the elections anyway and - more significantly - so was Aoun's. Obviously, Aoun can no longer claim with any credibility that he is on a selfless mission to restore status to Lebanon's key Christian post. Not surprisingly, Aoun is perfectly alright with undermining the Lebanese presidency - so long as it increases his chance of acquiring it.

Aoun may have won this battle, but he may very likely have lost the war in the process. The General is so divisive and his positions so replete with contradictions that his actions themselves expose his shallow and destructive political nature. The March 14 group should highlight the damaging implications of the elections instead of engaging in petty and, frankly, embarassing quarrels over a fraudulent Armenian ballot.

The Bitter Truth

As French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner leaves Lebanon looking more than a little foolish, one cannot but marvel at the optimism of some Western diplomats in their attempts to be part of a negotiated solution to the Lebanese standoff. No sooner had Kouchner gone home with his tail between his legs - having helpfully informed the Lebanese that they had better "resume dialogue" or risk civil war - when Spain jumped in to take his place. It is not difficult to predict what will come of Spain's efforts to mediate between Lebanon's different factions.

The belief that bitter enemies can resolve their differences if only they would agree to speak to one another strikes me as oddly out of place in a country like Lebanon - with its prevailing points of contention. This misconception about what is at stake in Lebanon is not shared by Syria, Iran, Saudi Arabia or the United States. These key players - and Lebanon's wiser politicians - understand better than others that the current Lebanese crisis is not about cabinet posts, parliamentary seats, electoral laws, Christian (or Shia, or Sunni, or Druze...) representation, or any other issues that can be addressed through the usual tit for tat political negotiations. They understand that Lebanon's crisis stems from fundamentally conflicting visions over the future, identity and regional role of the nation. These issues are infinitely more intractable than disagreements over parliamentary seats, portfolios and elections. In addition to that, the ever-present backdrop of violence - mostly involving Syrian agents killing their opponents - dictates that no solution can be possible without a convergence among key political actors on opposing and denouncing this violence and its perpetrators. So long as one group cheers the murder of the other - or acts as a silent accomplice in it - and so long as political factions fundamentally disagree about the sources of political legitimacy - be they elections, sectarian popularity, God, weapons or Ayatollah Ali Khamenei - there can be no reconciliation in Lebanon.

Reconciliation can only come about through a major shift in the strategic balance of power within Lebanon (i.e. the disarming of Hizbullah's militia); a near-miraculous change of hearts and minds about Lebanon's identity on the part of one side or the other (or both); or a settlement reached between foreign sponsors constraining the ability of Lebanese domestic actors to impose their agendas on their fellow countrymen. If none of this takes place, dialogue and a 'national unity government' will be as useless as the calls made for them by European foreign ministers.

Happy Anniversary, Hizbullah

It would be dishonest to say that last summer's war has been on my mind. In truth, Lebanon is much too preoccupied with problems of a more complex nature to be celebrating or lamenting Hizbullah's ' divine victory'. The upside is that Hasan Nasrallah has kept a low profile and mercifully spared us his self-righteous posturing over a starting war that destroyed Lebanon's economy and killed a thousand of its people. But since today is the anniversary of last summer's war, perhaps we should take a minute to contemplate its results...

Nothing polarizes a nation like a controversial war - especially one launched by non-state actors in the name of national resistance. One year down the line, both Hizbullah and the rest of us are paying the price for Nasrallah's adventurism. Talk of national victory at a time like this sounds exceedingly hollow, for Hizbullah has ceased to be a national resistance and has become just another petty Lebanese sectarian faction - made all the more dangerous than the rest by its militant ideology and links to Iran. Hizbullah's opposition camp in downtown Beirut is now nearly deserted - a pathetic symbol of Nasrallah's hubris, his fall from national hero to pariah in the eyes of half his countrymen and his very own contribution to the economic collapse of Lebanon.

So happy anniversary, Hizbullah. With victories like this one, who needs defeat?

Reap What You Sow

There comes a time in every Lebanese person's life when he or she must come to terms with uncomfortable facts and with tragedy. Often, such developments are not the result of deliberate planning - nor are they intended outcomes. The coming civil war in Lebanon may not have been foreseen or desired by its central actors. When it breaks out, fingers will be pointed and accusations will be made regarding who is to blame. At that point, however, it will make little difference - events have a way of taking on a momentum of their own and sweeping us along with them. I am sure that many a Lebanese person today knows exactly how that feels.

So where does that leave a citizen? It would be too easy to take a side, pledge allegiance to a tribe or its leader, wait for the fighting to break out and then say we never had any intention of going to war with our countrymen. But the truth is that all of us share the blame for our country's predicament. Because every time time we chanted out loud the names of leaders rather than ideas; every time time we accepted the devil's leadership because he represented our sect; and every time we strained to rationalize and forced ourselves to accept his poor decisions just to avoid the anxiety of questioning our tribe, we pushed our country closer and closer to the abyss, and chipped away at the new and fragile idea of Lebanon.

Our collective guilt does not make all of us morally equal. It does not even make the policies and visions of Lebanon's factions equally appealing or despicable. I still believe my 'side' to be more 'right' than the others - or, more accurately, less wrong. But the truth remains that any country whose citizens follow men rather than principles and belong to a tribe rather than a nation has no future in a region as merciless as the Middle East. Our 'side' may be correct in principle. But its pettiness and dishonesty and the pathetic reasons it enjoys much of its following mean that I can never be proud to belong to it.

Civil war is coming to Lebanon. We need not each take a side (although events and structure probably guarantee that we will), but let no one claim innocence for causing the coming Lebanese explosion. We are all guilty, and will all suffer accordingly.

The Case Against 'Levantism'

And for something slightly more relevant than the topic of our last entry, please see NOW Lebanon's latest commentary on the crisis below:


Last weekend it was revealed that Fatah al-Islam’s leader, Shaker Abssi, had been on the verge, before the fighting broke out a week and a half ago, of declaring Tripoli and its environs an independent Islamic “emirate” (from where he could no doubt engineer his fiendish and murderous brand of extremist Islamism). Meanwhile, mainstream Palestinian groups made the journey to the Grand Serail to present a four-point plan to resolve the standoff. It was dressed in typical Levantine give and take.

The plan calls for a ceasefire (no problems there), the creation of a Palestinian security force to maintain law and order in the camp (a suggestion that no doubt invokes the 1969 Cairo Agreement and implies Palestinian autonomy on Lebanese soil), the barring of other armed groups in the camp (a no-brainer if ever there was one) and finally, the creation of “a mechanism for the departure” of Fatah al-Islam from the camp.

The plan is a familiar recipe for disaster, which promises to perpetuate the decades-old stalemate that has done nothing to advance the cause of Lebanon’s Palestinian community and serves only to heighten a culture of martial machismo, one that begets further violence and sectarian tension; however, it is the final suggestion that, if implemented, smacks of an unconscionable concession by a weak administration.

In its Sunday edition, al-Hayat reported on Fatah al-Islam’s original plan to “announce its emirate over the largest possible area in the northern governorate.” Abssi anticipated that his troops “would not wait a long time to expand their influence from Nahr al-Bared to Tripoli, where Fatah al-Islam has sleeper cells that would allow the organization to interfere … and take control of the region, where an "Islamic uprising" would start and spread to other areas.”

However, the daily further observed that Fatah al-Islam had severely “miscalculated the situation,” particularly in regards to the Lebanese army response. Abssi and his peers had counted on internal Lebanese divisions to preclude any decisive action by the army – who he thus expected to be overwhelmed by Fatah al-Islam’s “units.” In addition, he expected to find the initiative met with support from Tripoli and reinforced by other extremist groups in the area. According to al-Hayat, even as Palestinian factions attempted to broker a truce, Abssi was just trying to buy time for Fatah al-Islam to mobilize its “sleeper cells” and allies and seize Tripoli.

The revelation of Fatah al-Islam’s broader agenda should be more than enough to take any chance of “safe passage” for the militants off the table in truce negotiations. Abssi’s group has openly advocated snatching as much of the North governorate as possible away from Lebanese sovereignty – and there is no reason whatsoever to imagine they won’t resume these efforts if not brought to justice. Moreover, it is safe to assume that other extremist groups in the country are watching the situation very closely. They must be shown, in no uncertain terms, that any assault on the sovereignty of the state, or its representatives in the military, will be decisively quashed. Their leaders must learn that once that path is taken, the only destination is prison – or death.

It is also imperative that after all the army’s sacrifices through the current crisis, the government does not let its troops down. There is a contract between the state and its soldiers: The army will defend the nation with their lives; in return, the government that sent them into battle will honor their contribution to the nation and not sell their memories short.

Fatah al-Islam’s plan isn’t working, because it bet on Lebanon’s weakness and division to hinder the Lebanese army’s response. Indeed, the role of the army and its defense of Lebanese sovereignty has been one of the more uplifting consequences of these bleak times. Wouldn’t it be ironic if, after all that has happened, and everything we ought to have learned from the past week and a half, we backtracked and proved Fatah al-Islam right?

Way to go Daily Star ...

28-05-2007
Editorial: Nasrallah's overture deserves reciprocation, not reproach

The knee-jerk reactions of several Lebanese leaders to Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah's most recent speech were so predictable that they could have been scripted months in advance. Progressive Socialist Party leader Walid Jumblatt, for example, slammed Nasrallah's remarks, saying that he had become a "mere tool" of the Syrian regime – a meaningless criticism which we have heard Jumblatt repeat in various forms for more than a year.

The tendency of Lebanese leaders to dismiss their rivals as the pawns of outside powers suggests that the country is currently governed not by statesmen, but by a dangerous, habitual discourse. Although it is convenient for Lebanese leaders to discredit their opponents in this way, the fact remains that it is the Lebanese who are ultimately responsible for the state of affairs in this country. And if all of our leaders would reflect seriously on that key question that has been posed by both sides of the divide– "Where are you taking us?" – they would recognize that they have been leading us down the path of internal discord and fragmentation.

Virtually all the members of the ruling coalition, much like the Western media, ignored the fact that Nasrallah at least tried to make a break from the dominant mode of discourse during his televised address to mark Resistance and Liberation Day. Nasrallah, who pointed out that "no one can delete the other from the political map of this country," called for the creation of an emergency unity government to shepherd the country through its current crises.This statement marked both a recognition of the gravity of the situation that the country is facing and a willingness to act responsibly. It also represented a departure from what has until now been an uncompromising stance on the part of the opposition with regard to its demands for either a certain number of Cabinet seats or early elections.

Nasrallah has essentially extended an olive branch to his rivals and his idea of an emergency unity government is one that should be received positively, both by the ruling coalition and by other members of the opposition.The idea will of course need to be expanded upon, and the two camps will need to agree on a predetermined time period in which this government will operate, as well as an agenda of specific issues that it will address, including the security crisis and the passage of a new electoral law.

Regardless of whatever any local leaders say, it is not the Syrians or the Iranians or the Americans or the French who will decide the destiny of this country: The fate of Lebanon remains in the hands of the Lebanese.

And the sooner Lebanese leaders take responsibility for their country and begin acting like statesmen, the sooner they can begin devising homegrown solutions to the multiple crises we are facing.

Black and White - for once.

Lebanon's politics are seldom simple. Time and again, we come across seemingly intractable crises in which the Lebanese are forced to forego decisive action in favour of consensus or compromise. Hizbullah must be disarmed BUT it enjoys legitimacy among almost half the Lebanese; the government is democratically elected BUT it cannot govern without support from Lebanon's important sects; Syria is trying to destroy Lebanon BUT half the Lebanese are allied with Syria, and so on...

So it is with some relief that Lebanon faces its current predicament, as strange as that may sound. That is because for the first time in a long while, it is facing a difficult but uncomplicated problem. Foreign militants have established a base of operations inside Lebanese territory, attacked the national army, and killed Lebanese civilians. They command little popular support and are of little use to Lebanon's relevant political factions. They are heavily armed and ready to fight to the death - but the Lebanese army is preparing itself for a bloody showdown, one which Fatah Al Islam will likely lose.

There can be no compromise or half measures in dealing with Fatah Al Islam. Evacuating Palestinian civilians from the Nahr Al Bared camp is prudent and just, but any concessions must end there. Lebanon is facing what I believe to be its most important challenge in years - one that it must win if the country is ever to become a real state, with all the benefits and responsibilities that come with that designation. If Lebanon succeeds in decisively defeating Fatah Islam, the legitimacy of the Lebanese state and its army will receive a much needed boost. The case for Hizbullah's militia will have been weakened, and a powerful message sent to Syria that it will have to come up with a better idea than Fatah Al Islam if it wants to destabilize Lebanon. Perhaps most importantly, it would represent a national victory of sorts and set an important civic precedent for Lebanese everywhere. Destroying the radical militia is essential not just for PM Siniora's government, but for the very survival of Lebanon. The Lebanese Army must attack Fatah Islam and succeed - whatever it takes. Every single member of the organization - or anyone who has ever aided them in any way - must either be killed or jailed. If they refuse to be taken prisoner, they should be made to pay with their lives. Nothing else will save Lebanon from the danger it faces today.

Inevitably, Lebanese will be killed outside the camp battleground - either by Fatah Islam itself or by Syria using the current battle for 'cover' to kill Lebanese. But this is not the time for national self-pity or victimization. This is war in its pure, unadulterated form. Nasrallah will make some noise about the war out of fear of the reprecussions of the Lebanese army's proving it can protect Lebanon. But even Nasrallah will not dare obstruct the army's mission, and thus can be effectively ignored. Other more strictly pro-Syrian lackeys like Suleiman Franjieh will grumble - to no avail. Good luck to our army and full speed ahead, I say. Kill or jail them all. Nothing less will suffice.

Robert Fisk Chimes in on battles in North Lebanon

Robert Fisk: Scores dead as Lebanese army battles Islamists in bloodiest day since civil war
Published: 21 May 2007

Butchery was the word that came to mind. Twenty-three Lebanese soldiers and police, 17 Sunni Muslim gunmen. How long can Lebanon endure this? Just before he died, one of the armed men - Palestinians? Lebanese? - we still don't know - shot a soldier right beside me. He fell down on his back, crying with pain, and I thought he had slipped on the road until I saw the blood pumping out of his leg and the Red Cross team dragging him desperately out of the line of fire. Not since the war - yes, the Lebanese civil war that we are all still trying to forget - have I heard this many bullets cracking across the streets of a Lebanese city.

And the dead. Five of the 17 gunmen were killed after paramilitary police stormed an apartment block in 200 Street in the centre of Tripoli. One lay on his back like a child, water from a broken hydrant streaming over his corpse. Another lay crumpled in a doorway amid glass and the Kalashnikov rifle he was still firing when he died. "How young they all were," a woman remarked with a kind of weariness, and I noticed the dead were also bearded, the little stubble beards al-Qaida's men like to wear.

The bloody events in Lebanon yesterday passed so swiftly - and so dangerously for those of us on the streets - that I am still unsure what happened. Clearly, an al-Qaida-type group tried to ambush the Lebanese army - and succeeded all too appallingly; 23 dead soldiers and police is a fearful figure for a tiny country such as Lebanon. But was it really a Syrian plot, as Fouad Siniora's government suggested? Was this the long hand of Syria stretching out once more across Lebanon's green and pleasant land?

So here are a few facts. A group of armed men tried to rob a Tripoli bank on Saturday and got cornered in an apartment block. Others holed up in the Nahr el-Bared Palestinian refugee camp north of the city. When I arrived yesterday, army tank fire was bursting in the camp and black-hooded policemen were preparing to storm, Iraqi-style, into the city-centre building. But the robbers were said to have stolen only $1,500. Was that worth this massacre? And is "Fatah al-Islaam" - which has existed in the shadows of the camp for months - really a 300-strong armed group?

Certainly the dead gunmen were real. I found two more heaped together in Tripoli, covered in spent ammunition clips, the apartment building on fire - so hot I could not get up the stairs - but families still struggling down. One woman carried a baby. "Only four days old, he is only four," she wailed at me. One family I found huddling in their bathroom, 12 terrified Lebanese who had spent 24 hours in this tiny room as bullets swept the walls of their home. So what in God's name happened in Lebanon yesterday?

Well, Mr Siniora claimed it was an attempt to destabilise Lebanon - a good guess, to put it mildly - and Saad Hariri, son of the former prime minister murdered here more than two years ago, called the armed men "evil-doers who had hijacked Islam". This is the same Saad Hariri whom at least one American reporter - I refer to Seymour Hersh - suggested was indirectly helping to funnel Saudi money to these same gunmen in a recent article in The New Yorker. The Shia Muslim Hizbollah are supposed to be the bad guys in this scenario, not a Sunni group.

But Tripoli is the most powerful Sunni city in Lebanon - so powerful that not a drop of alcohol wets its restaurant tables - and the men and women running in terror across Tripoli's streets yesterday were also Sunnis. So are the Syrians really concocting an "al-Qaida" in Lebanon? And who are its enemies? The Nato army of the UN force in southern Lebanon, perhaps? But surely not the Lebanese army, the very same army which bravely prevented civil war last January? Yet in 2000, an al-Qaida-type group also ambushed the Lebanese army in northern Lebanon. Was this, too, supposed to be a Syrian invention?

Showers of bullets were still tracing their way over Tripoli last night and the army was said to be preparing to move into the camps. Fatah, Yasser Arafat's clapped-out organisation, announced it was on the side of the army, a wise decision after yesterday's bloodbath. "A dangerous attempt to undermine Lebanon's security," was the response of a government whose Shia cabinet ministers abandoned it last year in the hope of bringing the whole Siniora administration down. But where do we go from here?

And who were the dead men I saw yesterday, perforated by bullets, partly torn open by grenades? Silent testimony is all we receive from the dead. One of them had big eyes above his fluffy beard, eyes which stared at us and at the police who jeered at his corpse. I wonder if they will not come to haunt us soon. And if we will discover what lies behind this terrible day in Lebanon.

Lucky Number Chapter 7

Months into the political deadlock that has paralyzed Lebanon, the elusive ratification of the International Tribunal is finally underway. Throughout the recent standoff between the government and the opposition, the issue of the tribunal - which is quite certain to implicate key Syrian officials in the murder of Hariri - has been a key sticking point. Having failed to pass the tribunal through constitutional Lebanese means due to the Lebanese opposition's refusal to convene parliament, the government has directly requested the establishment of the tribunal under a UN Chapter Seven mandate. The Lebanese opposition can no longer prevent the establishment of the tribunal through riots or fostering political deadlock. The tribunal is coming.

There are good reasons to be apprehensive of upcoming political developments in Lebanon following the establishment of the tribunal. Previously, decisive steps to put pressure on Syria usually resulted in the killing of Lebanese. Often, the Syrians have limited their attacks to politicians and intellectuals of importance. Recently, however, their has been a tactical shift and civilians are now fair game. Thus, the ratification of the tribunal will almost certainly be met by violence and terrorism against Lebanese officials and/or civilians. Moreover, there is little reason to expect any immediate political or strategic gains from the establishment of the tribunal. The tribunal is of little practical use if it is not combined with either a meaningful Lebanese-Syrian political rapprochement or a decisive strategic move against Syria. Neither seems imminent. Most likely, the tribunal will be established and the investigation will openly name Syrian officials involved in the murder of Hariri and several other victims in the months following his assassination. Bashar Assad has already refused to allow the tribunal to try Syrian nationals. So much, then, for the promised miracle of the tribunal.

There are, however, a number of potentially positive developments that may follow this much awaited tribunal's ratification. Most importantly, and perhaps paradoxically, the tribunal may create space for a political rapprochement within Lebanon itself. Having established the tribunal, the government can and must now devote energies and resources - as well as no small amount of political imagination - towards constructing a more fair and legitimate political arrangement with the opposition. The physical safety of government officials will undoubtably be in danger in the weeks to come, but security is tight, and a significant political victory will have been won against the opposition. Equally important, however, is the breathing space the Chapter 7 ratification creates for the opposition itself. Hizbullah and Amal in particular have made a point of hampering the tribunal's establishment, and understandably so - Syrian patronage comes at a price. But now, having proven to the Syrians that they have done all they can (short of initiating civil war, which most of the opposition does not want) to stop the tribunal, they may be able to buy themselves some maneouvering room free from Syrian direction by claiming they tried 'their best' to block its ratification and begin to think seriously about how they will coexist with other Lebanese factions. The opposition has succeeded in paralyzing Lebanon's political life but little else. Both sides have to make serious concessions, but an intractable symbolic hurdle will have been overcome by the Chapter 7 ratification.

The establishment of the tribunal under Chapter 7 is bad news for Bashar Al Assad. But despite the many short-term dangers to which Lebanon will be subjected in the weeks to come, it is on the whole good news for the country - if the Lebanese themselves can see the potential opportunities it creates.

A Blind Assessment: Communal Perspectives and Conjecture

The kidnapping saga involving Ziad Qabalan and Ziad Ghandour has come to a catastrophic end as their dead bodies were discovered yesterday in the Shouf region. This tragedy immediately acquired political overtones, perhaps inevitably, because of the timing and individuals concerned. It is rumored that Qabalan, a Sunni Muslim, was abducted in response to the killing of Adnan Shamas, a Shi'ite Muslim youth, during the clashes that occurred in and around Beirut Arab University on January 25th. Fears of retaliation have resulted in repeated calls for calm by leaders from both political camps, and while this is reassuring, the path forward is perhaps already slipping away. That is, control of the situation – and whether or not sustained violence occurs – is gradually escaping our political leadership.

That is not to say that the collective efforts of the main players within the domestic arena could not significantly reduce the potential for civil strife by ending the political stalemate that has caused this national malaise. A stable domestic situation would significantly reduce the effects of marginal extremists (or external actors, for that matter) by alleviating tribalistic insecurities that make it so easy to manipulate communal interaction in Lebanon. Within the existing political balance however, the zu'ama are slowly being drained of their capacity to control and direct their incited followers. Lebanon is gradually approaching that crucial threshold where the zu'ama, in order to salvage their political livelihoods, finally bend to the will of the people.

It matters not who committed these crimes, but who is perceived to have done so. The potential for conflict initiated by renegade groups is precisely why the leaders of March 14th and March 8th must return to the negotiating table. Even if – and the past months have illustrated this – there is no desire (or autonomous capacity) to resolve the internal aspects of the multifaceted stand-off in Lebanon, there should be a realization that conflict, at this point in time, will likely prove catastrophic to the goals of each camp in the near term.

The March 14th camp surely realizes that violence will further damage the post-2005 political platform that has dominated its public stance: government reform, moves towards economic prosperity, resisting the Iranian agenda in the Near East, and pressuring the Syrian regime in the international arena (ostensibly to reduce overt political interference in Lebanese affairs). The parties that form this coalition also stand to lose if conflict ensues:

• The Future Movement, led by Sa'ad Hariri, has championed its vision of Lebanon as a thriving commercial republic maintaining political neutrality (or perhaps, detached partisanship). Needless to say, this political vision, whether it is based on a coherent strategy for Lebanon or on a communal reaction to growing importance of the Shi'ite community in the Lebanese sphere, would be severally damaged by violent clashes that would (1) destroy what little politico-economic confidence is left in Lebanon and (2) draw the Sunni community into a conflict with a well-prepared adversary. We see then, that regardless of motivation, conflict is unfavorable at this stage.

• The Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) has an interest in resisting Syrian interference in Lebanon – if only because of the vociferous stance that its leader, Walid Jumblatt, has taken vis-à-vis the Ba'athist leadership. At a deeper level, it seems that the Druze community is in the process of converging with the Christians on broader issues relating to the political system in Lebanon and Lebanese foreign policy – this may perhaps be taken to be a result of, again, the growing role of the Shi'ite community. Socio-historical insecurities that long characterized relations between the Druze and Maronites may perhaps be shifting to encompass Druze-Shi'ite relations, especially if one parallels the growth in Shi'ite population and prominence with the phenomenon experienced by the Maronites in the 18th and 19th centuries.

• The Lebanese Forces party (LF), led by Samir Geagea, most certainly has a desire to oppose the reassertion of Syrian hegemony in Lebanon and – as with the Sunnis and Druze – most likely seeks peace as a prerequisite for a new 'Merchant Republic'. The LF, as well as the Future Movement and the PSP, has also sought to rebuild state institutions – whatever the motivation for this, it is clear that civil strife would undermine this goal. These goals would be threatened by sustained conflict in Lebanon, as would the goal of Christian consolidation. Let us take a tangent outlining the dilemma facing the Christian community, one that is essential to the resolution of the long-term effects of this stand-off. Contrary to appearances, the split between the LF and the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) is not centered on a new divergence regarding Syrian interference in Lebanon – this remains anathema to most Christians. Instead, the current divisions within the Christian community are a result of two factors. Firstly, one must consider the personal struggle between Geagea and Aoun for supremacy, for communal leadership. However, this struggle is rooted in a fundamental divergence regarding the projection of Christian interests within Lebanon and the region. Perhaps this has been arrived at unintentionally, but the split seems to reflect a serious dilemma for the Christian community as a whole: Is it preferable to (A) enter into alliance with the Sunni and Druze communities in order to preserve the sectarian system as it currently exists, more or less, and once again counteract an expansion of the Shi'ite role, or (B) align with the Shi'ite community, arguably uniting the two largest communities within Lebanon and accelerating de-confessionalization? Whatever the intended aims of each camp, civil war would only – as in the past – polarize the Christian community as the prelude has already polarized its leadership.

We see then, that the broader goals of the March 14th camp, as well as the more particular goals of its constituent groups, can only be aided by the avoidance of prolonged conflict. This brings us to the March 8th coalition, which has stressed the importance of fighting corruption in government, guarding against Israeli aggression, and resisting the American agenda in the region. This has entailed opposing the Hariri tribunal as a project, as it has been viewed as a politicized attempt to pressure the Syrian regime. A review of the opposition parties reveals that violence also hampers their narrower goals:

• Hezbollah: while this party undoubtedly holds an advantage in military capability, it stands to lose out substantially in an internal conflict. Firstly, such a conflict would merely distract the party from its foreign policy goal of confronting Israel. Secondly, it is difficult to envision how Hezbollah would conduct a war in Lebanon – the potential for gain is limited, and the feasibility of consolidating gains (both territorial and institutional) is, for all practical purposes, negligible. Of course, this neglects the political disaster that the organization would be confronted with: war, in the long-term, would likely damage the remaining multi-communal acceptance that allows Hezbollah to remain effective in confronting Israel. Finally, the internal goals of the organization – enhancing Shi'ite contributions to the decision making process in Lebanon and ensuring a more equitable distribution of resources – could not possibly be advanced without some accommodation from other communities (and other parties within the Shi'ite sect), and it is difficult to envision how war could bring this about in the short-term.

• Of all parties involved, AMAL, led by Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri, is perhaps the least capable of developing an autonomous platform. This is not to say that Berri is bound to the decisions taken by Hezbollah, but that AMAL cannot – at this juncture – distance itself from its current stance without absorbing a serious blow politically. Perhaps growing frustration with the current paralysis will grant Berri the political capital needed for a rapprochement with the March 14th camp.

• The FPM has largely maneuvered on the basis of two factors: opposition to the Hariri legacy (on the whole) and the attempted consolidation of Michel Aoun's position within the Christian community. Aoun has entertained presidential hopes since his return from exile, and at one point could have been considered as the first choice of most Christians, especially Maronites. Support for Aoun has since waned, as he has entered into opposition with Hezbollah and AMAL – this in itself is not as problematic as the manner in which his opposition has translated on the ground. The disturbances in January, combined with his being outmaneuvered by Geagea in the immediate political aftermath, have significantly reduced his direct support amongst Christians (he still benefits from reluctance on the part of many of his former supporters to endorse the LF).

Prospects of sustained violence, it would seem, have no potential to yield substantial gains to any of the parties involved. However, there should be serious worry that these parties will be drawn into the conflict that they should be seeking to avoid. One must wonder how capable these leaders are of restraining people should these sporadic disturbances continue – in fact, the more the leaders try, the more desensitized the population becomes. The opposition surely realizes this and will perhaps ease its stance, especially given the anticipation of conflict within a regional context. Indeed, one must wonder if both camps are biding their time. If this is indeed the case, then we can perhaps expect a return to negotiations soon – this will ease the danger of internal conflict, but should serve as a signal of expectation. Whether this expectation is correct or not, is another question best left open to debate.

Political Fun / Solid Initiative ??

Apr. 26, 2007 9:16
Dreamy weekend in Syria for only $390
By SHEERA CLAIRE FRENKEL - Jerusalem Post.

A sultry-eyed woman beckons from under her hijab, welcoming Israelis to the sandy hills and glittering ocean in the backdrop. "Dreamy weekend in Syria - only $390," advertises the billboard.

While enticing Israelis to travel by featuring attractive women and scenery are nothing new, these billboards were created to stop Israelis in their tracks. Israelis, or anyone with an Israel stamp in their passport, cannot currently travel to most member states of the Arab League, but these ads feature "enemy states" such as Saudi Arabia and Syria in a whole new way.

The billboards, which will be unveiled in Jerusalem on Thursday by Avaaz.org, offer the great weekend deals with only the fine print noting that the price is for one room, a double bed - and dependent on the Saudi peace plan.

"Peace deals are like travel packages - you need to know what you're getting," said Avaaz.org's campaign director Paul Hilder. "It's time for Israel to test this Arab and Palestinian offer - and to prove its own seriousness by putting core issues like borders and Jerusalem on the table."

Last week, Jordan's King Abdullah invited Acting President Dalia Itzik to Jordan, and impressed upon her the seriousness of Jordan's commitment to the Arab Peace Initiative. Itzik and other Knesset members called the trip a "serious move" on the part of the Jordanians to advance the peace process.

Avaaz.org, a global civic advocacy group, began the billboard campaign as part of "Real Peace Talks Now," a campaign to get Israeli, Palestinian and international leaders to start full negotiations before June 5, which marks the 40th anniversary of the 1967 Six Day War.

"Israelis love travel, but our focus groups burst out laughing when they saw these ads. Their [Israelis] visiting Damascus, Dubai, even Jericho is inconceivable today - unless they're in uniform," said Hilder. "We wanted to help Israelis look and think again about the Arab Peace Initiative, we wanted them to think about what normalization really means."

Roie Yeilin, who was part of the Israeli team that helped conceive of and create the billboards, said Avaaz was trying to engage Israelis and not "tell them what to do."

"It is mostly young people in this organization," said Yeilin. "We are speaking to them in their language, with humor, in an Internet-savvy and multimedia type of way."

Avaaz.org was cofounded by Res Publica, a global civic advocacy group, and MoveOn.org, an Internet advocacy group in the United States.

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I think that anyone who has been to Syria or Damascus in particular would think it would be quite funny to imagine Israelis there on a tourism trip, but on the other hand, this article is wishfully forecasting a brighter future for the region... After all, why not ? Any peace/truce situation would be better than periodical wars in a constant conflict.

Maybe politicians should start giving it some serious thought instead of always declaring that "we will be the last country to sign any peace agreement"... BUT any peace agreement should be a fair one, to us Lebanese of course, but more importantly: to the Palestinian cause and their "right of return to their land"... Forcing the nationalization of the Palestinians in Lebanon or any of their current locations is not the first step (or a step in general) on the road to regional peace... It's actually the key to more chaos...

Response to Anonymous

Anonymous,

While I believe the comment to be blown out of proportion, the point has been taken. In my defense, it is quite to difficult to write a proper analysis of an article when law school responsibilities come at you in such a number.

In regards to the analysis of the article. The article was posted as an 'interesting' read and nothing more. While there are things on which I agree with Fisk I fear that his article is more idealistic than realistic or practical.

All of us would prefer the solution to the critical situation currently prevailing in Lebanon to be solved internally. In a perfect and idealistic world, it would be. In a perfect world there would be no need to ally oneself with a foreign power. The problem, however, is that we do not live in the idealistic Lebanon that Fisk implies in article. The real Lebanon is a Lebanon divided into two camps, March 14 and March 8. The foreign powers that these two camps are associated cannot be stated as allies. Saudi Arabia and the United States on the one hand and Iran and Syria on the other are puppet-masters directing their puppets, March 14 and March 8. For two dependent political entities to muster enough courage to break the chains set upon them by their 'masters' is an incredibly far-fetched idea, and quite honestly, I feel that Fisk must have been on something if he genuinely believed there was a possibility for that to happen.

The fact that we, a small and almost defenseless country, must side with greater powers in order to attempt to prosper and expand is a reality that I have come to grips with and have come to accept. The question now becomes who does one side with?

Fisk mentions the constant failures and mistakes of the current Bush Administration and its western counterparts, and in some cases such an opinion is hard to argue. One must, however, look at the alternative: a hostile country with a maniac at its helm (Iran) and their Syrian counterparts. Counterparts that proved to be a horribly parasitical presence in Lebanon for more than 30 years. A country that ravaged not only Lebanon's political domain but destroyed any economic and social expansion. A country that played a major role in our +50 million debt. A debt which the Saniora government is attempting to relinquish through the generous help they garnered from not only the US government but most of Europe and the Middle East. Yes the United States have made mistakes but at the same time they along with their European and Middle Eatern allies are the only foreign entities actually trying to remedy the situation.

Now to return to Fisks claim that things can only be fixed internally. I tell him that the current situation we face can be attributed to what happened internally over a year ago. Prior to Michel Aoun and his FPM joining the ranks of Hezbullah he found himself at a crossraods. In one direction, continue to side with a March 14 that wasn't exactly welcoming him with open arms or ally with Hezbullah.

Had Aoun biten the bullet and continued with the March 14 movement the current situation would have a much different flavor. Had Aoun sided with March 14 Hezbullah would have been left between a rock and hard place. They would have been left without a Lebanese ally and would have been forced to negotiate and compromise their strict stance or face a potential Lebanese revolt against them, as in that case the non-Hezbullah side would have then composed a significant majority of the Lebanese population.

Aoun chose to take the other route. He allied with Hezbullah and hence gave them a new lease on life a new lease that allowed them to instigate the purposeless and irresponsible war with Israel this past summer.

This leads me to think two things of Aoun. First, this major political figure made one of the worst gaffes in the history of political alliances and took the majority of Christian Lebanese down with him, or, this supposed 'patriot' felt taking a stance that any logical human